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Summary 
In Southern Africa, the last 10 years have seen a rather dramatic shift in donor and state 
interest and funding from ‗Community Conservation‘ to ‗Transfrontier Conservation‘. The 
new trend broadens the aim of conservation-development interventions to also include inter-
state cooperation. The article critically analyzes this development within a wider shift in 
neoliberal politics. It is argued that this broader shift helped create the right ‗enabling 
environment‘ for the transfrontier conservation discourse to be presented as an all-embracing 
and unifying ideological ‗model of meaning‘. Moreover, underlying neoliberalism‘s 
contemporary political conduct is a strong reassertion and the actual neoliberalisation of the 
state. It is this move that has truly enabled the ‗Transfrontier‘ to revive the telos of 
conservation in Southern Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
 
―How can we explain the tremendous increase in the number of transboundary protected areas in the last 
few decades? And why has this phenomenon generated such tremendous enthusiasm in the conservation 
community? The answer is that the transboundary element can act as a multiplier, greatly amplifying the 
benefits protected areas already provide. Transboundary conservation area initiatives allow conservationists 
to operate at a larger scale, moving across political boundaries to protect a transboundary ecosystem in its 
entirety, rather than stopping at political borders that rarely correspond to natural systems. By the same 
token, a TBCA [Transboundary Conservation Area] can create unique social opportunities; for example, by 
reuniting communities divided by borders or allowing mobile peoples to move across their traditional 
territories more easily. TBCAs also add an enticing political dimension to conservation, which is the 
capacity to reduce tensions or even to help resolve conflicts between countries, in particular those stemming 
from boundary disputes. This peace-making dimension enlarges the range of benefits parks provide in a 
significant way. It also provides powerful evidence for one of the central tenets of conservation – that 
protected areas are not only necessary to secure the planet‘s ecological integrity but, more broadly, that they 
are an essential component of any healthy, peaceful, and productive society‖ (Mittermeier et al, 2005, page 
41). 
 
Transboundary or transfrontier conservation has indeed generated tremendous enthusiasm 
among conservationists. The world over, this trend has unleashed many new possibilities for 
the conservation community to link its political agenda with that of others and arouse public 
support and sentiment. As the quote indicates, transfrontier conservation enables 
conservationists to operate at a larger scale, create ‗unique social opportunities‘ and ‗add an 
enticing political dimension to conservation‘, namely that of conflict resolution and peace-
building. As such, transfrontier conservation has given the conservation community a new set 
of ‗levers for engagement‘ with which to reach out to other actors and so try to create wider 
political legitimacy for its mission. Moreover, the new trend has not only reinvigorated, but 
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perhaps even transcended the conservation paradigm of community conservation which has 
been hegemonic – at least in policy – from the 1980s onwards. 
 
The Southern African region has been central in this trend. In fact, where its regional 
‗Community-Based Natural Resource Management‘ (CBNRM) programs have long 
influenced and inspired conservation interventions in other parts of the world, this role seems 
to have been taken over during the late 1990s /  early 2000s by several major Transfrontier 
Conservation Areas (TFCAs). Not long ago, CBNRM programs such as CAMPFIRE
1
 in 
Zimbabwe, LIFE
2
 in Namibia, ADMADE
3
 in Zambia and the CBNRM programme in 
Botswana stood firmly in the global conservation limelight. Nowadays, transfrontier 
conservation areas such as the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park between Mozambique, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Maloti-Drakensberg TFCA between Lesotho and South 
Africa and the Kavango-Zambezi TFCA between Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe occupy the position of international sources of inspiration for conservation
4
. The 
shift in donor and state attention from community to transfrontier conservation is further 
evidenced by the literature, interviews by the author and trends in donor funding.  
 
An early Southern African study on ‗transboundary natural resource management‘ noted that 
―TBNRM is viewed by many proponents as an evolution of CBNRM in border areas (…)‖ 
(Jones and Chonguiça, 2001, page 49). According to an interviewee, an influential 
environmental officer from Lesotho, in the mid to late 1990s, donors such as the World Bank 
were actively shifting their conservation funding strategies towards projects with the word 
                                                 
1
 Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources. 
2
 Living in a Finite Environment. 
3
 Administrative Management Design Programme for Game Management Areas. 
4
 Obviously, there are more in the Southern African region, but these are some of the TFCAs that have seen most 
investment, especially the Great Limpopo. Mittermeier et al (2005), for example, argue that the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park is one of ‗three exemplary cases‘ globally. 
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‗transfrontier‘ in it5. Most significantly, in terms of donor funding, it is illustrative to look at 
the funding figures for the above major CBNRM programs and compare these to funding for 
TFCAs. While comprehensive, comparative data on donor funding for community based 
natural resource management and transfrontier conservation in Southern Africa is lacking, 
research by the author indicates that donor funding for CBNRM has gone down substantially, 
while TFCA funding has seen a rapid increase over the last ten years. Tables 1 and 2 provide 
a crude overview of some of the donor funds spent on CBNRM and TFCAs in Southern 
Africa. While the numbers in the tables by no means represent the totality of funding for 
either CBNRM or TFCAs, it is clear that funding for the latter has eclipsed the funding of the 
former quite dramatically.  
 
Table 1: Funding status major Southern African CBNRM programs 
 
Program  Funding            Major Sources     Status 
LIFE, Nambia 
US$16,845,827 (LIFE I: 1993-1999) USAID, WWF 
Major donor funding 
ended June 2008 
US$15,118,535 (LIFE II: 1999-2004) USAID 
US$11,100,000 (LIFE PLUS: 2004-2008) USAID 
CAMPFIRE, 
Zimbabwe
6
 
US$28.1 million (1989-2003) USAID 
Almost all donor funding 
ended early 2000s US$12,190,293 (1994-2002) Norad/WWF 
ADMADE, 
Zambia 
US$4,8 million (1989-1999) USAID 
Program ongoing, but 
major donor funding 
ended in 2000 
CBNRM 
Botswana 
US$ 19,9 Million (1989-1997) USAID  Program ongoing, but 
major donor funding 
ended in 2005 
Approx. €490.000 (US$ 650.000) (1999 – 
2005) 
SNV / IUCN / 
HIVOS 
Sources: App et al, 2008; http://www.usaid.gov/zw/html/NaturalResources.html; Balint and Mashinya, 2006; 
Taylor, 2006; Frost and Bond, 2008; Nico Rozemeijer (former SNV advisor to the Botswana CBNRM support 
programme), Pers. Comm.; Jones, 1999. Website last viewed: 7 April 2009. 
 
Table 2: Funding status Transfrontier Conservation in Southern Africa 
 
Major sources  TFCAs              Funding         Status 
World Bank (& GEF) 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park US$ 5 Million 
Pilot project (1996-
2003) 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park US$26,7 Million Ongoing, until at least 
                                                 
5
 Interview Environmental Officer National Environmental Secretariat Lesotho / Consultant, 28 April 2005, 
Maseru, Lesotho. 
6
 According to Frost and Bond (2008: 778): ―Information on the amount of funding from sources other than 
USAID is not readily available. Moreover, these funds were allocated to support community-based natural 
resource management generally, not just CAMPFIRE‖. 
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Lubombo TFCA 2013 
Chimanimani TFCA 
Maloti-Drakensberg TFCA (2003 
– 2008) 
US$15,3 million 
Project ongoing, 
major funding ended 
2008 
Peace Parks 
Foundation 
Involved in all major Southern 
Africa TFCAs, but most heavily in 
the Great Limpopo 
Approx SA Rand 200 / 
250 Million (+/- US$ 
22 / 27 million) total 
assets annually 
PPF founded in 1997 
and will be ongoing 
for foreseeable future 
USAID 
Great Limpopo, Kavango Zambezi 
+  ZiMoZo TFCAs (1998 – 2004) 
US$ 3 Million 
Funding for TFCAs 
stopped in 2004 as 
priority shifted to 
transboundary water 
management 
Conservation 
International  
Ai-Ais Richtersveld TFCA 
US$150,000 annually 
(as from 2004) Ongoing (funding for 
Kgalagadi TFCA to 
be renegotiated in 
2011) 
Kavango Zambezi TFCA 
US$300,000 annually 
(as from 2004) 
Kgalagadi TFCA 
US$500,000 annually 
(as from 2007) 
KfW (German 
Government) 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park 
€12 Million (US$ 16 
Million) 
Ongoing 
AFD (French 
government) 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park 
€11 Million (US$ 14,5 
Million) 
Ongoing 
Sources: PPF financial reports 2006; 2007 (calculations include PPF group & company); Dr. Leo Braack 
(Director: Southern Africa Wilderness & Transfrontier Conservation Programmes, Conservation International), 
Pers. Comm.; www.worldbank.org; http://www.awf.org/section/heartlands; 
http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/afr/isa.html,; http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACD874.pdf,; 
http://www.rural21.com/uploads/media/ELR_engl_50-53.pdf. All websites last viewed: 7 April 2009. 
 
When comparing the two tables, several issues stand out. First, the four CBNRM programs 
had a distinctly national character and much of their funding comes from one source, USAID. 
Hence, much CBNRM funding stopped when USAID discontinued their support for the major 
programs in the early 2000s. By contrast, TFCAs are multinational by nature, which leads to 
more fragmented donor funding. This is the reason why table two takes major funding 
agencies as its primary point of departure, rather than TFCAs. Important here, however, is 
that all sources point out that the variety of donors that supports TFCAs is much greater and 
more diverse across public and private sectors than was the case for CBNRM.7 Second, 
TFCAs in Southern Africa are facilitated by an extremely successful (from a financial point of 
                                                 
7
 Conservation International, for example, did a ‗partial inventory of organisations active in the proposed Kaza 
TFCA between Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which included 40 donors and NGOs, 
while the Peace Parks Foundation is financially backed by its ‗Club 21‘, consisting of 21 wealthy companies and 
individuals. 
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view) funding organization founded solely for the purpose of stimulating TFCAs, namely the 
Peace Parks Foundation (PPF). CBNRM programs did not have this ‗luxury‘.  
 
Third, neither table includes funding from the national states, but state funding obviously 
plays an important role. While the Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe governments 
have continuously provided – and continue to provide –funding for CBNRM, this has also 
been eclipsed by state funding for transfrontier conservation. Most noticeably, this is because 
the best resourced state – South Africa – started contributing substantially after apartheid. 
Observations in and interviews with staff members of South Africa‘s Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) over a three-year period (2005-2008) clearly 
indicate that transfrontier conservation has been better institutionalized and better state-
funded than CBNRM ever was. CBRNM is one of many priorities in the ‗Biodiversity and 
Conservation‘ Branch, while transfrontier conservation has been a separate, well-staffed and 
well-funded directorate since the early 2000s
8
. The current importance of TFCAs within 
DEAT can be further emphasized by the recent establishment of another directorate, the 
‗TFCA 2010 Development Unit‘, which focuses on linking TFCAs to the 2010 world cup 
soccer. 
 
While not stating that CBNRM has ‗disappeared‘ in favor of TFCAs, the shift in funding 
resources is striking, with the early 2000s showing CBNRM funding on the decline and 
funding for TFCAs strongly on the rise. Interestingly, why this shift took place has been little 
investigated. So far, much of the nascent, but burgeoning literature on TFCAs has focused on 
whether TFCAs can keep their multiple promises (Duffy, 2006; Ramutsindela, 2007; Van 
Amerom, 2005; Wolmer, 2003), particularly with respect to local communities (Draper et al, 
                                                 
8
 See http://www.deat.gov.za/. Last viewed: 1 April 2009 
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2004; Whande, 2007). A theoretically solid explanation for the rather dramatic shift in donor 
and ‗conservation community‘ attention from CBNRM to TFCAs is still lacking. This lack is 
especially surprising since CBRNM was long heralded as the telos - the ultimate purpose or 
form - of conservation, but lost much of its glow due to disappointing results and increasingly 
fundamental criticism from the mid-1990s onwards (Hutton et al, 2005). Since then, 
conservationists have sought to construct a new telos for conservation; something that would 
generate the ‗tremendous enthusiasm‘ that the conservation community was longing for and 
that would enable it to source new revenues and renew its ties to important constituencies. 
 
This article aims to address the gap in the literature, arguing that the main way in which 
conservationists have taken up this challenge is by reconstituting conservation in neoliberal 
terms. It was hoped that by further cementing CBNRM into the larger framework of 
capitalism the market would productively connect conservation and development where the 
state had failed. Yet, neoliberal ideology has itself been subtly but swiftly changing, with due 
consequences for the CBNRM paradigm. Understanding these important shifts in today‘s 
globally dominant political ideology of neoliberalism, I argue, is critical in explaining why 
CBNRM could no longer revive the ‗tremendous enthusiasm‘ so sought after by 
conservationists whereas transfrontier conservation did. First, and leaning on work by 
Baudrillard (1994), the article contends that the level of the symbolic has taken on increased 
significance in contemporary neoliberalism as a way of ‗solving‘ or concealing the 
(increasingly intense) contradictions of late capitalism. Similarly and as stated above, TFCAs 
have (quite literally) broadened the conservation mandate to create new symbolic ‗levers for 
engagement‘ with novel and previous constituencies. Second, following Peck and Ticket 
(2002, page 384, emphasis in original): 
―there seems to have been a shift from the pattern of deregulation and dismantlement so dominant during the 
1980s, which might be characterized as ―roll-back neoliberalism,‖ to an emergent phase of active state-
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building and regulatory reform – an ascendant moment of ―roll-out neoliberalism.‖ In the course of this 
shift, the agenda has gradually moved from one preoccupied with the active destruction and discreditation 
of Keynesian-welfarist and social collectivist institutions (broadly defined) to one focused on the purposeful 
construction and consolidation of neoliberalised state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory 
relations‖. 
As the article will show in more depth, CBNRM has been neatly aligned with ‗roll-back 
neoliberalism‘, while transfrontier conservation is more attuned to ‗roll-out neoliberalism‘. It 
is this quality that has truly enabled the ‗Transfrontier‘ to revive the telos of conservation 
 
After some further remarks on the move from community to transfrontier conservation in the 
context of neoliberalism in the next section, the argument will unfold in two steps. First, I will 
outline what I regard as fundamental changes in neoliberal political practice from ‗1980s 
neoliberalism‘ to its more contemporary 1990s and 2000s character. Second, I will show how 
these changes created new possibilities to reinvigorate the telos of conservation, namely by 
making use of the spaces provided by the ‗transfrontier trend‘ to reconstruct conservation as a 
‗model of meaning‘ and, crucially, by ‗bringing the state back in‘. Throughout, I will illustrate 
the argument with research done on Southern African transfrontier conservation areas 
between 2003 and 2008, in particular the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Project (MDTP) 
between Lesotho and South Africa. The article concludes with some final reflections. 
 
2. From community to transfrontier conservation in the context of neoliberalism 
The history of conservation paradigms in (Southern) Africa is well covered in the literature 
(see Adams and Hulme 2001; Adams and Hutton, 2007). Important to mention here is that 
CBNRM policies arose out of a desire to redress the colonial ‗fortress conservation‘ model 
that emphasized protected areas, limited to no use of natural resources and a separation 
between humans and nature. It tried to do so by allowing sustainable use of natural resources 
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and empowering ‗communities‘ to take charge of conservation (Brockington, 2002). In line 
with models of participatory, sustainable development, one of CBNRMs most appealing 
(theoretical) strengths lay in its ability to construct win-win solutions for both biodiversity and 
‗local communities‘. As a consequence,  
―CBNRM has enjoyed a long and successful career at the center of international projects and programs, in 
spite of a stream of critiques and evidence of failure. A sceptical view of CBNRM would treat it as a 
fashion, in a catwalk of fashions—community development, micro-credit, farming systems, livelihood 
approaches and so on have filed past (…), but even the sceptic would concur that this model has had 
exceptional longevity‖ (Blaikie, 2006, page 1952). 
 
Thus, the main reason why CBNRM has become hegemonic is not just because it aimed to 
rectify fortress conservation. In practice, it often did not (Adams and Hutton, 2007). The point 
is that CBNRM provided theoretical benefits on such a wide scale that it firstly enabled many 
actors with divergent agenda‘s to crowd under a common umbrella and secondly enabled the 
discourse to produce and reproduce its own success. According to Blaikie (2006, page 1954): 
――success‖ is reproduced within a network of multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies, international NGOs, in-
country NGOs and a limited number of senior government officials in recipient countries. The discursive 
power of the theoretical benefits to environment and community of CBNRM, the need to proclaim success 
to other international audiences, and the diffuseness and range of the social and environmental objectives, 
all lie behind representations of this ―success.‖ Success, in turn, is defined in ways that will allow it to be 
found. Success stories prevail against criticism that comes from other quarters (particularly local people who 
have experienced CBNRM, and independent commentary from scholars)‖. 
Indeed, criticisms about CBNRM to have neither fulfilled its conservation or development 
objectives are plenty (Wainwright and Wehrmeyer, 1998; Wunder, 2001), yet have little 
impeded on its popularity. 
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Beside the above explanations for CBNRMs continued (theoretical) ‗success‘, there is, 
according to McCarthy (2005), another reason why CBNRM has remained popular: its ability 
to hybridize with today‘s dominant political ideology of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, though 
difficult to define (Castree, 2008a), relates here to the political ideology that aims to subject 
political and social affairs to market dynamics. According to McCarthy (2005, page 998), 
neoliberal and CBNRM discourses have similar invocations of the concepts of ‗civil society‘ 
and ‗community‘ respectively. He discerns three ways in which the concepts are ‗functionally 
analogous‘. First, both neoliberal and community conservation discourses construct civil 
society and community as ―unified, cohesive entities, obscuring differentiation within groups 
while hardening the boundaries between them‖. Second, McCarthy argues that both 
discourses ―tend to construct civil society and communities as inherently democratic and 
flexible, and states as inherently less democratic, leaning towards centralization if not 
totalitarianism‖ (idem, page 999). Third, this aversion to state interference almost ‗naturally‘ 
leads the two discourses to stress the ‗inevitable‘ bond between communities / civil society 
and markets as the spaces that are ―cast as the aggregate results of free individuals voluntarily 
entering into contracts and associational life, free of coercion from the sovereign‖ (Idem, page 
999). As such, CBNRM has appeared remarkably congruent with (roll-back) neoliberalism, 
leading to hybridized models of governance that aim to reconstruct conservation/development 
realms as markets. 
 
While McCarthy perceptively clarified the analogous ways in which neoliberal and 
community conservation discourses construct and inform hybridized models of governance he 
leaves implicit the political strategies (consciously or unconsciously) intended or propagated 
by proponents and followers of neoliberal conservation discourses. For the current argument, 
it is important to recognize that the politics of neoliberalism has also seen subtle, yet far-
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reaching changes since the 1980s. Igoe and Brockington (2007, page 435), hint at these when 
they state that  
―neoliberal conservation moves beyond a world of win-win solutions to a world of win-win-win-win-win-
win-win (or win
7
 if you like) solutions that benefit: corporate investors, national economies, biodiversity, 
local people, western consumers, development agencies, and the conservation organizations that receive 
funding from those agencies to undertake large conservation interventions‖.  
They too, however, do not explicate the changes in neoliberal political conduct that have 
made ‗win7‘ constructions not only necessary for political legitimation, but also believed to be 
viable by neoliberals. 
 
It is here that our analysis of the move from community to transfrontier conservation in 
Southern Africa truly begins. After all, transfrontier conservation – according to its 
proponents - adds important ‗wins‘, to community conservation. The most important is that of 
cooperation and peace across international boundaries. But as the quote in the introduction 
indicated, one should also think about increased geographical and political scale and increased 
‗social possibilities‘. However, merely stating that transfrontier conservation increases the 
amount of ‗wins‘ of conservation constructions does not aid the theorizing around 
(transfrontier) conservation, the move from community to transfrontier conservation and the 
connections with neoliberal ideology. The next sections therefore embed these discussions in 
an explicit theory on the substance and meaning of contemporary neoliberal politics and show 
how this frames and legitimates transfrontier conservation. 
 
3. Contemporary modes of neoliberal political conduct 
In earlier work (Büscher, 2009) I attempted to develop a theoretical framework around 
contemporary modes of neoliberal political conduct that research has shown are pertinent in 
understanding the constitution of neoliberalism in (Southern African) 
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conservation/development interventions. These political strategies will be summarized here 
and should be seen in an overall framework in which they are reinforced by, and themselves 
reinforce, particular ‗technologies‘ of neoliberal devolved governance, such as competition, 
commercialisation and ‗promoted self-regulation‘ (McCarthy, 2005). Three political modes 
are distinguished: consensus, anti-politics and marketing. I argue that in conjunction with 
forms of neoliberal devolved governance, these three modes are vital in understanding the 
depth and breadth of neoliberalism‘s reproduction through conservation/development in 
Southern Africa, while also providing a strong explanation for the shift from community to 
transfrontier conservation. 
 
Underlying the discussion are two assumptions about neoliberalism, namely that it has 
progressed from its 1980s variant to a late 1990s, 2000s version and that its proponents are 
‗blatantly‘ universal in their ambitions. In line with Peck and Tickell (2002), these 
assumptions refer to what Overbeek (1999, page 248-249) suggests are several important 
‗moments‘ in ―the process of global restructuring and the neoliberal ascendancy‖, namely 
from 1980s neoliberalism as a ‗constructive‘ project, imposing structural adjustment, 
privatisation, etc., to the hegemonic consolidation of neoliberalism as ―the global rule of 
capital‖ in the 1990s. I will return to the first assumption later. For now, the second 
assumption is important for understanding the political mode of consensus in that 
neoliberalism‘s universalism collides with a strong pressure for ‗actor and thematic all-
inclusiveness‘ in conservation. ‗Neoliberalism‘s universalism‘ relates to the well established 
supposition that neoliberals believe that their ideals and modes of governance are universally 
valid and applicable. From this arises a tendency to bring ever more people and aspects of life 
into the neoliberal framework.  
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Similarly, contemporary conservation must not only take ‗communities‘ into account but also 
cater for the private sector, NGOs, the state, influential individuals, tourists, and others (Igoe 
and Brockington, 2007). Moreover, besides conserving biological diversity, conservation 
agencies are nowadays also pressurized to take social, gender, international cooperation, 
security and other ‗issue areas‘ into account. Hence, conservation‘s constituencies and 
interests are persistently broadening and conservation interventions have increasingly been 
forced to speak in consensus rhetoric to capture these actors and interests (Petersen et al, 
2005). Illustrative of many contemporary conservation policies, an unpublished memo written 
for the Maloti-Drakensberg TFCA stated that the overall planning framework for the Maloti-
Drakensberg bioregion for 2008-2028 is supposed to guide ―all action, whether country-
specific or joint, collectively contributing to the achievement of the project purpose (impact) 
and vision / overall goal‖. 
 
Importantly, the consensus strategy should be seen within a tendency to increasingly construct 
conservation/development arenas as ‗self-regulating markets‘ whereby ‗consumer 
constituencies‘ have to provide legitimacy and reconstruct their social relations into economic 
ones. The language of consensus, coupled with neoliberal governance schemes such as 
‗payments for environmental services‘ (Wunder, 2007), then becomes subsumed under a 
neoliberal political strategy to make all ‗stakeholders‘ feel as though they gain their ‗rightful‘ 
place in a conservation/development market. A consultancy report produced for the Maloti-
Drakensberg TFCA illustrates the point:  
―payment for environmental services provides an incentive for directing landowners towards environment 
management actions that address priority environmental services, such as water security. As a payment 
system directly links buyers and producers of environmental services, it builds relationships between people 
who are economically linked and allows market based transactions to take place, reducing the need for 
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further state regulation. Furthermore it focuses on measurable deliverables and consequently sharpens the 
performance of conservation actors (public, private or communal)‖ (Diederichs and Mander, 2004, page 5). 
 
Here, the link between consensus and neoliberal conservation is obvious. Yet, to retain this 
image of all-inclusiveness and consensus in the face of actors capable of critically scrutinizing 
and resisting ones political agenda requires a second neoliberal mode of political conduct: that 
of antipolitics. Political modes of antipolitics entail a strategy of positing or constructing a 
reality such that it seems not to be debatable but ‗taken for granted‘ or ‗the logical/rational 
choice‘. The familiar way to do so in conservation/development interventions is through 
‗rendering technical‘, what in fact is political (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007). Yet, following 
Schedler (1997, page 12), the concept of antipolitics should be conceptualised much broader; 
indeed as ‗reshaping politics‘ in such a way that a particular image or ‗partial rationality‘ is 
imposed onto it. Besides technical or instrumental antipolitics, Schedler distinguishes several 
other types of antipolitical strategies, among which moral antipolitics. Simply put, this 
strategy comes down to replacing democratic debate with a particular ‗moral high ground‘. In 
the case of the Maloti-Drakensberg TFCA, research pointed out that one of the reasons why 
the South Africa and Lesotho project teams implementing the TFCA often came into conflict 
was because both teams had established a certain ‗high ground‘ that was not to be 
‗compromised‘ (key informant interview, 23 September 2005). For South Africa this was the 
technical planning process, while Lesotho chose the moral high ground of CBNRM. In the 
end, the TFCA became a mix of both strategies which further worked to depoliticize the 
power differences between them and between the project and the supposed beneficiaries. Like 
consensus, the political strategy of antipolitics fits contemporary neoliberalism; it fits a 
market environment that works to ‗discipline‘ subjects into – often literally - ‗buying into‘ 
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ones political agenda and so stimulating and further entrenching neoliberal modes of devolved 
governance
9
. 
 
Both these neoliberal modes of political conduct aim to frame conservation/development 
interventions and realities as all-inclusive, rational and free from contradictions. Yet, time and 
again, critical research has shown that they are rife with contradictions (Ferguson, 2006; 
Kovel, 2002; Li, 2007). Accordingly, I argue after Baudrillard (1994), that a preference for 
discourse, images and signs over ‗reality‘ is cultivated. After all: the symbolic realm of 
discourse seems better fitted to try and control or mediate contradictions - through discursive 
grooming and promoting ‗sign values‘ - than ‗reality‘, even if ‗reality‘ is always inherently 
socially constructed. This is where the third and final neoliberal political strategy comes in: 
marketing. Marketing here entails the manipulation of abstraction in order to gain competitive 
advantage. Increasingly, conservation/development interventions depend on branding 
themselves and their objectives as valuable and legitimate parts of the public space in order to 
stand out against competing claims on the public space. Moreover and despite a master-
narrative of CBNRM, conceptual competition within the conservation/development sector is 
rife. As a result, marketing and branding as methods to exploit the tension between ‗reality‘ 
and its construction, becomes a political necessity to gain competitive advantage and so bring 
ones agenda to the fore. In turn, this marks a further neoliberalisation of 
conservation/development through the creation of a political valorization system that is deeply 
capitalist in nature.  
 
Arvidsson (2005, page 236) explains that: ―brands are mechanisms that enable a direct 
valorization (…) of people‘s ability to create trust, affect and shared meanings: their ability to 
                                                 
9
 For a more in-depth discussion, see Büscher, forthcoming. 
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create something in common‖. Yet, these objectives are not valued in themselves; they have 
to lead to something that can be validated commercially:  
―the systematic push towards sign value was a response to the limits of the commodity form. Constructed 
to support expanded and regularized consumption of commodity consumer goods, the sphere of 
commodity signs was itself an effort to overcome earlier limits to the growth of capital‖ (Goldman and 
Papson, 2006, page 336).  
Nonetheless, and as we shall see in more depth below, marketing as a vehicle to create 
meaning and ‗something in common‘ is convincingly illustrated by the ways in which TFCAs 
are marketed. The following remark by Nelson Mandela, one the founding patrons of the 
Peace Parks Foundation, is used particularly often in marketing material:  
―I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which does not agree with the peace parks 
concept as we see it going into fruition today. It is a concept that can be embraced by all. In a world beset 
by conflict and division, peace is one of the cornerstones of the future. Peace parks are a building block in 
this process, not only in our region, but potentially in the entire world‖. 
 
Taken together, the three modes of consensus, antipolitics and marketing present a 
particularly strong and resilient set of political practices that is not only able to maintain 
legitimation for conservation/development interventions, but also works to mask the ‗uneasy 
contradictions‘ in neoliberal conservation. But this analytical framework must be taken 
further still, as conservation/development arenas are not the only ‗public‘ sphere that have 
internalized these shifts in neoliberal political conduct. To the contrary: this needs to be 
viewed within the context of the neoliberalisation of the wider public sector, especially the 
state. Following Peck and Tickell (2002), contemporary neoliberalism has progressed from its 
1980s ‗roll-back‘ to 1990s and 2000s ‗roll-out‘ neoliberalism that implicates not only the 
(public transfers to the) private sector but the actual neoliberalisation of the state. Similarly, 
Moore (1999: 64) argues that  
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―If the era of ‗structural adjustment‘ economic policies of the 1980s and earlier 1990s meant attempts to 
‗get the prices right‘ and to hack away indiscriminately at the state, then we are now in the age of ‗getting 
the state right‘ to implement the same goals as before‖.  
 
Hence, not only does the state support neoliberal governance strategies such as competition 
and commercialisation, it actively partakes in them; even disciplining itself accordingly, for 
instance by substituting traditionally public sector operating principles (like cross-
subsidization, supply-driven service, etc.) to private sector operating principles (like 
managerial and financial ring fencing, demand-driven service, etc.) (McDonald and Ruiters, 
2005). Getting the state to support neoliberal policies and in fact to internalize neoliberal 
political conduct, in turn fuels a continuous deepening of neoliberalisation across society. And 
while this is not to say that neoliberalisation is a linear process and neoliberalism‘s various 
constitutions always remain context, place and time specific, its global hegemony does imply 
that similar type processes can be seen across the globe (Castree, 2008b, page 157). I argue 
that the political strategies of consensus, antipolitics and marketing are an integral part of 
these processes and that they can provide clues to a wide myriad of contemporary trends and 
questions, for instance that of how ‗the transfrontier‘ revived the Telos‘ of conservation in 
Southern Africa. 
 
4. Seeking Telos in the Transfrontier 
Based on the above, I argue that transfrontier conservation, at least in Southern Africa, 
reconstituted and reinvigorated the telos of conservation in two main ways: first, by being 
better suited to frame and subject conservation to the three ‗modes of neoliberal political 
conduct‘ described above; and second, by strategically incorporating the neoliberal state. 
 
4.1 Transfrontier conservation as a model of meaning 
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Let us return to the quote at the start of the article; this time more critically. What is striking 
firstly is that the political dimension of TFCAs is squarely equated with peace-making. That 
few (social) scientists would directly equate politics with peace-making is an understatement. 
This idea, however, has gained such firm ground that TFCAs are also commonly referred to 
as ‗Peace Parks‘. Secondly, the paragraph praises the multiple positive effects of TFCAs: in 
the environmental, social, economic and the politics realms, TFCAs supposedly bring great 
and positive contributions, ‗greatly amplifying the benefits protected areas already provide‘. 
Naturally, this is marketing speak, as in the real world the social, political, economic or even 
environmental benefits of (transboundary) protected areas are not as clear cut (Brockington et 
al, 2008; Igoe, 2004; Reyers, 2003; Van Amerom and Büscher, 2005; Wunder, 2001). 
Thirdly, the paragraph as a whole explicitly tries to mold protected areas into a new all-
embracing teleology of ‗health, peace and productivity‘, with the adjective ‗transboundary‘ 
being the latest and, I argue, most definitive stage in the molding process. 
 
When studying transfrontier conservation areas in Southern Africa, evidence for the last point 
is overwhelming. Special attention should be reserved for the earlier mentioned Peace Parks 
Foundation. The PPF is a non-governmental organization, founded in 1997 by the late South 
African billionaire entrepreneur Anton Rupert, the late Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands 
and former South African president Nelson Mandela with the sole purpose of stimulating the 
establishment of TFCAs. It is exceptionally well resourced and well-connected politically and 
economically and has therefore been able to influence Southern African TFCA development 
tremendously (Spierenburg and Wels, 2008). As such, the following takes the PPF as the 
empirical point of departure. The argument I will advance is that proponents of TFCAs, 
especially the Peace Parks Foundation, try to construct transfrontier conservation as a model 
of meaning to which people can attach their identity and emotions as well as the telos – the 
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end state or ‗natural‘ order - of conservation and development more generally. In this way, 
they are able to adhere to the three modes of neoliberal political conduct of consensus, 
antipolitics and marketing. 
 
The background to this argument is Marx‘ assertion that ―liberal capitalism alienated people 
from the environment in ways that ecological connections were no longer evident to them‖ 
(Brockington et al, 2008, page 197). Marx‘ overall assertion, of course, was much broader 
than the environment. In a capitalist world, he argued, where in principle everything can be 
commodified, alienation continuously deepens in general. This, in turn, is associated with loss 
of meaning as meaningful attachment gives way to commercial rationality (Arvidsson, 2005). 
Baudrillard (1994, page 80), in turn, has taken this point further and argued that in our 
‗hyperreal‘ information society, information ―exhausts itself in the act of staging 
communication‖ and that ―rather than producing meaning, it exhausts itself in the staging of 
meaning‖. Yet, in true capitalist fashion and as Brockington et al show, this does not deter 
entrepreneurs to exploit this new space, namely by reattaching meaning to and engagement 
with commercial products (such as nature is fast becoming) through consumption. Nowhere is 
this better understood than in contemporary private sector marketing that tries to tie products 
in with personality attributes, passions, personal emotions, and so forth, in order to ‗hook‘ 
clients on a deeper level (Arvidsson, 2005). In turn, there seems to be no actor in transfrontier 
conservation that understands this better than the PPF, an organization originating from and 
rooted in ‗big business‘, as shown by Ramutsindela (2007). In their public relations for ‗peace 
parks‘, I argue, PPF, but also other actors, employ all the familiar marketing moves of 
contemporary advertising and public relations to make TFCAs meaningful to ‗stakeholders‘. 
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The first point to make is that, if politics is about competing interests and making choices, 
then the ‗peace parks discourse‘ promoted by the PPF tries to avoid this by literally trying to 
take everything related to conservation and development into account. Looking at the lists of 
criteria and principles that donors and ‗stakeholders‘ want conservation/development schemes 
to attend to, peace parks surely seem to be the epitome of what can be asked of these 
interventions: besides conserving nature and reducing poverty, they are supposed to facilitate 
participation, enhance ownership, empower communities, enhance international cooperation 
and understanding, re-unite and reinvigorate cultures, stimulate spirituality, encourage 
economic growth and tourism, educate, form partnerships, bring peace, enhance security, 
adhere to good governance and so forth. Hence, the conservation-development telos seems 
complete and ready to compete. Where states used to be the archetypical focal points to lead 
these objectives, with the shift from government to governance and the changing nature of the 
state itself, many other actors try to fill the void left by a less all-encompassing 
conceptualization of the state.  
 
As a result, non-governmental and private actors strategically started competing for popular 
support to legitimize their existence and interventions in the public arena. The way to do this 
is similar to more ‗classical‘ political mobilization: to gather as many people as possible 
under unifying, all-embracing and seemingly non-contestable concepts, premises and 
promises. The PPF tries to do exactly this, and does so rather bluntly. For example, the 
official slogan of the PPF reads ‗the global solution‘ (see figure 1), indicating that the peace 
parks concept as they see it are the perfect conservation/development constructions that can 
appropriately be implemented throughout the globe. Another example is the extremely 
strategic use the PPF makes of its patrons and founding patrons, especially former South 
African President Nelson Mandela. Obviously, Mandela is one of the most recognizable and 
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most respected people in the world today and to have him as founding patron, regularly 
endorsing PPF activities and initiatives – for example through the quote above - probably 
guarantees the highest buy-in one could get from any endorsement.  
 
[Insert figure 1 somewhere here] 
 
Interestingly, not all staff members of the PPF themselves always agree with the way the PPF 
conceptualizes peace parks, but most are still admirers of its founder, Anton Rupert, and 
believe that he ‗gave them‘ the tools to make their common ‗dream‘ a reality (PFF staff 
member, Pers. Comm. 2005). In fact, the person of Rupert himself is used as a tool by the 
PPF to present peace parks as models of meaning, as Rupert‘s life is portrayed as arguably the 
most meaningful life that could be lived. Nowhere is this clearer than in a brochure dedicated 
entirely to Anton Rupert‘s life entitled ‗An Idea that Binds. How Anton Rupert‘s Philosophy 
of Co-Existence and Partnership Culminated in Peace Parks‘ (Peace Parks Foundation, no 
date). In it, Rupert is portrayed as a role-model to follow: a hard worker, successful business 
entrepreneur and patron of nature who despite his enormous successes in life remained a 
humble man. The brochure even highlights Rupert‘s resistance against apartheid based on his 
‗philosophy of co-existence between man and man and man and nature‘:  
―The policy of apartheid stymied the development of the entire Southern Africa. When Rupert‘s philosophy 
of co-existence was discussed in the South African parliament in 1966, he was accused of trying to establish 
Hong Kongs and Singapores in South Africa! If only South Africa had done so way back in 1966…..!‖ 
(Peace Parks Foundation, no date, page 3). 
 
The brochure goes on to praise Rupert‘s achievements in nature conservation by founding 
WWF South Africa and how this ‗culminated‘ in the ‗global solution‘ of peace parks. 
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Different aspects of peace parks are explained, after which the brochure ends by quoting some 
of Rupert‘s practical philosophies and wisdoms in life10. These portrayals of Rupert do not 
only come from the PPF, however. Many others, especially after his passing in January 2006, 
described him in similar terms
11
. More critical literature, however, has problematised these 
‗successes‘ and shown them to be both factually and contextually incorrect. First, it has 
repeatedly been pointed out that there are large contradictions in a ‗benevolent conservation 
tycoon‘ that made most of his fortune from cigarettes, liquor and luxury goods, many of 
which depend on mining and natural resource extraction (Spierenburg and Wels, 2008). 
Second and more seriously are the social dislocations as the result of TFCA establishment. 
The most well-known example here is the pending eviction of some 28.000 people from 
Mozambique‘s Limpopo National Park, which is a direct result from the establishment of the 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (Spierenburg et al, 2008). Third and last, many of the 
community benefits promised by Rupert‘s Peace Parks Foundation have not been 
forthcoming, as acknowledged by the Foundations‘ CEO who stated in a meeting, attended by 
the author, that the five million people living next to the South African side of the Great 
Limpopo are not benefiting from the peace park yet and that ―this is a problem‖12. 
 
These critical remarks in the literature, however, have had little impact on what is the crux of 
the argument here, namely that Rupert is portrayed as a role-model, whose life was 
meaningful in multiple ways. In an interview, Van Riet, former CEO of PPF states: Dr Rupert 
―is the catalyst, by example. His whole life has been taking an idea and putting it into a real 
                                                 
10
 Such as (PPF, no date: 33): ―Confidence begets confidence. It certainly is a risk to trust, but mistrust is an even 
greater risk that can lead to disaster. If you don‘t trust others, you probably can‘t trust yourself!‖. 
11
 To quote but one example, the South African Sunday Times of 22 January 2006 titled its piece ‗The 
Benevolent Tycoon‘ and added that ‗the good doctor‘ ―Anton Rupert channelled his desire to be a doctor into 
using his wealth to benefit others‖. 
12
 Prof. Van Riet, CEO of the PPF, in a presentation at the Dutch embassy in Pretoria on 9 March 2005. 
 23 
venture, and he‘s applying those things to his conservation activities. I am his arm, his 
weapon‖ (Weaver, 2001, page 9). In brief: the direct link between Rupert‘s exemplary life and 
peace parks again serves to construct the latter as ‗models of meaning‘ through which people 
can obtain new hope in conservation, development, peace and Africa. 
 
Other examples, like the quote at the beginning of the article, are plenty, but the point 
remains. Peace parks are presented as all embracing ideological models of meaning, and often 
linked to more widely accepted, fundamental ‗models of meaning‘ such as religion. In PPF 
brochures, TFCAs combine the ‗Garden of Eden‘ with business sense, both of which are seen 
as natural to humans. In this vein it is apt to heed Marden‘s (2003, page 185) words  in that 
―indeed, the spiritual centre of contemporary life in modern capitalist society is deemed by the 
protagonists to be corporate in origin, and is itself, one manifestation of the deification of the 
market and the triumph of antipolitics‖. Yet, the inverse of the above argument might also 
illustrate why the construction of peace parks as a model of meaning is a consensus oriented, 
antipolitical strategy. One could argue that, instead of TFCAs forming ‗the global solution‘ to 
social, environmental, political and economic problems, they in fact are the solution to many 
of the social, political, economic and environmental pressures on environment and 
development interventions today.  
 
Let me state this more bluntly: influenced by neoliberal logics (Castree, 2008a) and further 
reinforced by the exponential increase in organizational development (Igoe, 2004), many 
aspects of our world, and especially such politically sensitive issues as 
conservation/development, have reached such heights of political sensitivity that consensus-
oriented anti-political strategies have become an absolute necessity to get new initiatives off 
the ground or maintain existing ones. This does not imply that TFCAs are mere discursive 
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constructions to deal with the pressures of our time. TFCAs do have validity in reality as 
indeed it makes (biological, managerial) sense that ecosystem across borders are looked at 
and managed holistically; that often previously disadvantaged communities living in or near 
these areas have a say in the management of TFCAs and that more regular cooperation 
between countries could enhance understanding. Yet, when implemented and legitimated the 
neoliberal way, these issues are increasingly torn between the enormous expectations of peace 
parks as discursive ‗models of meaning‘ and the contradictions in reality described in a 
growing body of literature (Büscher, 2009; Duffy, 2006; Wolmer, 2003). 
 
4.2 Soothing the state 
In the PPFs attempt at playing the neoliberal consensus, antipolitics and marketing game by 
positing TFCAs as models of meaning, another crucial element is added to the mix: the return 
of the state in conservation. As narrated above, community conservation shared with earlier 
neoliberalism an inherent mistrust of the state. In line with more recent developments in 
neoliberal practice, transfrontier conservation ‗brings the state back in‘. Obviously, this is not 
to suggest that neoliberalism‘s ambivalence towards the state – on the one hand that the state 
is all that is ‗bad‘, while on the other hand that the state is necessary as an ‗enabling 
environment‘ (Moore, 1999) – is gone. Rather, the necessity of the state and its importance as 
a (public-private) partner in the further neoliberal constitution of conservation/development 
has now been recognized by neoliberals, such as the PPF. As such, facilitated by its enormous 
financial resources and fund-raising capabilities, the PPF has been able to create direct access 
to, and, I argue, even direct the relevant actors and policies of practically all Southern African 
ministries of environment and tourism towards its objective of facilitating ‗peace parks‘.  
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According to Prof. Van Riet, CEO of the PPF in a presentation at the Dutch embassy in 
Pretoria on 9 March 2005 attended by the author, the management of PPF is concerned mostly 
with access to and space for ‗peace parks‘ and facilitation and training regarding the 
development of TFCAs. Facilitation according to Van Riet means to ―oil the government 
machinery and so fix what is broke‖. Practically, the PPF has ‗oiled the government 
machinery‘ by funding the appointment of a staff member working solely on TFCAs in nearly 
each ministry of environment and/or tourism in Southern Africa. According to a PPF memo:  
―Based on the tremendous success PPF had with the secondment of a TFCA Technical Advisor to South 
Africa's Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, it is now planned to create a network of similar 
positions throughout the SADC region within each of the conservation agencies. One of the biggest 
requirements to promote the TFCA concept is continuity. Through appointing a person dedicated to focus on 
TFCA issues with the support of PPF assisting technically, logistically and financially a great impact can be 
made on various fields but most importantly at a political level to influence and empower decision-makers‖ 
(Peace Parks Foundation, 2002, page 5).  
Besides staff, PPF also supply national departments with technical and financial resources, 
such as maps, overview documents and they bring governments and other actors together by 
setting up, financing and organizing conferences and workshops. According to Büscher and 
Dietz (2005, page 5):  
―in this way, not only has the PPF direct political access by contributing a wide variety of resources, they 
also have an edge in directing policy because they can influence part of the content, as the resources they 
offer are directly being used by ‗their‘ officers in the various departments to make decisions in the policy 
process‖. 
 
In the literature, the close bonds between the white, Afrikaner dominated PPF and the South 
African state has been given cultural explanations in that transfrontier conservation aroused 
the creation of ―‗Super-African‘ identities, based on identifying with nature and the landscape 
rather than the nation-state‖ (Draper et al, 2004, page 341). Based on the above, I would like 
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to put forth a different argument; one that places emphasis on the importance of the state in a 
global and a regional Southern African context. Both black and white elites in South Africa 
have actively subjected themselves to the global neoliberal project during the 1990s (Bond, 
2000) and the ‗soothing‘ of the state by the PPF and the state approval of this should be seen 
as an acceptance of the increasingly important role attributed to the state as a tool for the 
further entrenchment of neoliberal practices. The common argument for the state emphasis in 
TFCA development is that nation-states are the only actors with international negotiation 
powers. Yet, in a swiftly neoliberalizing economy with tremendous emphasis on the 
importance of tourism, the state plays a vital role in providing ‗services‘ such as security, 
international investor confidence, a legal framework, etc. Hence, the positing of TFCAs as the 
central strategy for growth in tourism by the PPF cannot but acknowledge and incorporate the 
state as crucial hereby. 
 
This line of thinking also fits better with the ‗state fetishism‘ so prevalent in South Africa, as 
explained by Neocosmos (2003, page 343):  
―In South Africa […], state fetishism is so pervasive within the hegemonic political discourse that debate is 
structured by the apparently evident ‗common sense‘ notion that the post-apartheid state can ‗deliver‘ 
everything from jobs to empowerment, from development to human rights, from peace in Africa to a cure 
for HIV-AIDS. As a result not only is the state deified, but social debate is foreclosed from the start; the idea 
simply becomes one of assessing policy or capacity. In other words the focus is on management not on 
politics‖.  
In turn, this ‗state fetishism‘ acknowledges the importance of consensus and antipolitics, 
which in effect completes the ‗neoliberal circle‘. The true telos of conservation brought by the 
‗transfrontier trend‘ therefore is that the state is back in, and actively partakes in the new 
neoliberal modes of political conduct. 
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5. Conclusion 
The article has sought to provide a theoretically robust argument for the sudden shift in donor 
and ‗conservation community‘ attention in Southern Africa from community to transfrontier 
conservation. It argued that the transfrontier movement has, more so than community 
conservation, enabled proponents to package conservation as an all-embracing and unifying 
ideological model of meaning that links with contemporary ‗modes‘ of neoliberal political 
conduct, specifically those of consensus, antipolitics and marketing. Underlying 
neoliberalism‘s contemporary political conduct, however, is a strong reassertion and the 
actual neoliberalisation of the state. It is this move that has truly enabled the ‗Transfrontier‘ to 
revive the telos of conservation in Southern Africa.  
 
Important to repeat is that transfrontier conservation has not replaced community 
conservation. The point is that transfrontier conservation has added more ingredients to the 
basic community conservation model in order to better link it up with contemporary modes of 
neoliberal political conduct, and so increase conservation‘s avenues for acquiring political 
legitimation. Moreover, positing transfrontier conservation as a model of meaning is also not 
to say that TFCAs are indeed expected to compete with or even replace more fundamental 
‗models of meaning‘ such as religion. My point here is about the influence of neoliberalism 
and its effects on conservation/development about which two issues should be raised as 
concluding reflections.  
 
The first links in with Morris‘ (2005, page 698) statement that  
―while it is highly unlikely that postmodern commodification and consumption have simply replaced 
ideology and religion as the principal binding forms that give ‗real‘ meaning to people‘s lives, these 
processes nevertheless pose significant challenges to the maintenance of coherent and enduring 
interpretative communities‖. 
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Similarly, the rather abrupt change in the overall telos of conservation through the 
‗transfrontier trend‘ has obviously not replaced the many meanings embedded in the human 
articulation with nature. In line with other scholarly work (McCarthy, 2005; Igoe and 
Brockington, 2007), it does corroborate, however, that the field of conservation is 
increasingly becoming subjected to neoliberal logics, which can indeed ‗pose significant 
challenges‘ to the endurance of the conservation community and its articulation with ‗nature‘.  
 
The second has to do with the actual effects on biodiversity and the social relations around 
biodiversity. The article has indicated that the supposed multiple positive effects of TFCAs on 
conservation/development have not yet materialized. The new neoliberal energy brought in by 
the transfrontier trend might then do more harm than to challenge the conservation 
community‘s articulation with nature. Rather, it will further reify the current status quo about 
which most conservationists agree that it can and should be improved significantly. 
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